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study the e¤ects of implementation of a¢ rmative action policy,
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1 Introduction
A¢ rmative action is a public policy instrument that has as its object the
amelioration of the adverse e¤ects of discrimination on a¤ected groups
of individuals. Practical implementation of a¢ rmative action programs,
however, is the source of intense public discussion. One of the main issues
in this discussion is potential consequences of a¢ rmative action policy
with respect to e¤ort incentives and how this a¤ects the e¤ort levels of
both the discriminated and non-discriminated individual. Economic
theory that addresses the problem of potential e¤ects of a¢ rmative ac-
tion programs with respect to e¤ort provision is very scarce and provides
little guidance. The main aim of this paper is an attempt to bridge this
gap in theoretical analysis by addressing the question as regards possible
e¤ort level e¤ects of a¢ rmative action policy.
The problem of e¤ort provision under equal treatment and a¢ rma-
tive action policy was studied in Franke (2007). The author develops
a simple model which is a version of a rent-seeking game in the style
of Tullock (1980) with heterogeneous players. In his work two potential
ethical interpretations, that hold contestants ethically responsible or not
responsible for the source of their heterogeneity, lead to two policy op-
tions: equal treatment policy and a¢ rmative action policy. Both policies
are dened formally as restrictions on the contest rule which, depend-
ing on the implemented policy option, imply di¤erent e¤ort incentives
for the individuals. With this formulation, the key question studied by
the author is how individuals react to the changes in incentives that are
induced by the two policies. He shows that, as the response to the im-
plementation of a¢ rmative action policy, the total e¤ort level of players
always increases.
One of the main assumptions in Franke (2007) is that players always
move simultaneously. This assumption is typical in the contest game lit-
erature and may hold in some contexts, especially when the competitors
do not have possibility to observe each other. In many other contexts,
however, agents do not decide about their e¤ort levels at the same time
and may observe each other1. Therefore, the objective of this paper
1Real contests (e.g., promotion tournaments or tournaments between salesmen)
show that agents often act sequentially and may be able to observe their competitors
e¤orts when deciding on their own e¤ort. Hence, the individuals may get some
information during the game, which will inuence their succeeding e¤ort choices. It
is obvious that these features cannot be discussed within a simultaneous-move game.
In addition, some contests are even organized sequentially in practice, which holds
for diverse sport contests. This sequential-move approach nds justication also on
microeconomic theory grounds (for instance in Leininger (1993), Morgan (2003) and
Baik and Shogren (1992)).
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is to study the problem of e¤ort provision under equal treatment and
a¢ rmative action policy in a sequential-move case. Using similar set-
ting as in Franke (2007), we consider a contest in which individuals are
assumed to choose their e¤orts sequentially and can observe their oppo-
nents choices. In our two-player contest, one of the agents rst chooses
his e¤ort. After that, the other agent observes this e¤ort and then has
to decide about his own e¤ort level. Using the formal denitions of
the policies as in Franke (2007), we study how individuals react to the
changes in incentives induced by the two policy options and how those
reactions depend on the order of their moves2.
Using our model we show that the order of moves of contestants is a
very important factor in determination of the e¤ects of the implementa-
tion of a¢ rmative action policy. Moreover, we prove that in such cases a
signicant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of individuals.
In particular, contrary to Franke (2007), it is shown that in a two-player
contest game, as the response to the implementation of the a¢ rmative
action policy option, the total equilibrium e¤ort level of the contestants
may decrease in comparison to the unbiased contest game. This happens
when the non-discriminated individual moves before the discriminated
one and the underlying heterogeneity of individuals is not too severe.
However, when the underlying heterogeneity of individuals is very se-
vere or both individuals move in the reversed order, then the e¤ect of
the a¢ rmative action policy option on the total equilibrium e¤ort level
2The economic literature on sequential-move contests suggests that, when the
leader is a "non-discriminated" player (with lower marginal cost of e¤ort), and the
follower is a "discriminated" one (with higher marginal cost of e¤ort), then higher
e¤ort levels exerted by the rst agent are met by lower e¤ort levels exerted by the
second agent. As a consequence, the rst agent can credibly commit to increase
his e¤ort expenditures knowing that this will be protable in increased probabil-
ity of winning owing to the second agents reduction in expenditures. Intuitively,
the implementation of a¢ rmative action policy, which favors a discriminated contes-
tant, should increase his e¤ort expenditure at the cost of decreasing the e¤ort of a
non-discriminated contestant. The net e¤ect on the sum of equilibrium e¤ort levels
is therefore unclear and would depend on the size of individuals reactions to the
changes in the incentives. This is one of our key questions that we study in this
paper. In the opposite case, as the literature suggests, when the leader is a discrim-
inated player and the follower is a non-discriminated one, the rst agent can a¤ord
to reduce his exerted e¤ort level, knowing that the second agent will follow this be-
havior and likewise reduce. In this case, the possibility to commit to a lower level of
e¤ort enables the discriminated player to credibly reduce the "aggressiveness" of the
contest. Again, intuitively, the implementation of a¢ rmative action policy, which
favors a discriminated contestant, should increase his e¤ort expenditure and also of
his opponent - of a non-discriminated contestant. The net e¤ect on the total e¤ort
seems here to be positive. Checking this prediction is another key question of our
paper.
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is always positive, as in Franke (2007).
In our analysis we also compare the games with di¤erent orders of
moves, including a simultaneous-move one, given the policy option: the
equal treatment or the a¢ rmative action. This part of our analysis re-
veals that under the a¢ rmative action policy option, the order of moves
is irrelevant. In this situation, independently of the order of moves 
when the non-discriminated individual moves before the discriminated
one, the other way round or when they move simultaneously, each indi-
vidual exerts his e¤ort at the same level and the total e¤ort level is the
same.
As a part of our analysis, we also study preferences of the contest
organizer for the two policy options, assuming that he is purely interested
in maximizing the total e¤ort level exerted by the contestants. We show
that if the contest organizer cannot specify the order of moves of the
contestants in a game, that is this order is determined endogenously by
the players, then he always prefers the implementation of a¢ rmative
action policy to equal treatment policy. These preferences are somehow
changed, if specied order of moves is exogenous for the players, and
the contest organizer is able to make them move according to this order.
In such a situation, in general in all cases of the order of moves the
contest organizer prefers the implementation of a¢ rmative action policy
to equal treatment policy. The exception is the case in which the non-
discriminated individual moves before the discriminated one. In this
particular situation  independently of whether this order of moves is
exogenous for the contest organizer or whether it is selected by him
as the one which maximizes his utility he may sometimes prefer the
implementation of equal treatment policy to a¢ rmative action policy.
This happens when the underlying heterogeneity of the individuals is
not too severe.
Our work is related to some other models in the economic theory lit-
erature. It builds directly on the paper by Franke (2007), mentioned
earlier, who investigates the problem of e¤ort provision under equal
treatment and a¢ rmative action policy in a simultaneous-move setting.
It is also related to numerous papers that study the e¤ects of a¢ r-
mative action policy in various settings. Most closely related to our
paper are studies of the e¤ects of a¢ rmative action policy in competi-
tive situations. For instance Fryer and Loury (2005) consider a simple
model of pair-wise tournament competition to investigate group-sighted
and group-blind forms of a¢ rmative action in winner-take-all-markets.
Fu (2006) addresses the problem of a¢ rmative action policy in admis-
sions to a college using a two-player all-pay auction model. Schotterand,
Weigelt (1992) using the tournament-game framework study experimen-
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tally whether a¢ rmative action programs and equal opportunity laws
a¤ect the output of economic agents. Our work is also related to the pa-
pers that study sequential-move contest games. For instance, Leininger
(1993) shows that in a two-player contest with heterogenous contestants
sequential play arises endogenously. When contestants are homogenous,
either sequential or simultaneous play can arise as equilibrium. The het-
erogeneity is understood there as the fact that agents have asymmetric
valuations of the prize3. In Leininger (1993) the timing decision occurs
following the realization of valuations for each of the contestants. This
is what makes the Leininger (1993)s model di¤erent from the one in
Morgan (2003), where the timing decision is determined prior to the
realization of specic valuations. In Morgan (2003) contestants are ex
ante homogenous and always move sequentially in equilibrium. Baik
and Shogren (1992) analyzed a contest with heterogenous contestants
in a very similar but a little more general framework than Leininger
(1993). They also show that sequential play arises endogenously as in
Leininger (1993). Ludwig (2006) compares sequential and simultaneous
contests under di¤erent informational settings: contestants types are
either public or private information. Glazer and Hassin (2000) study
a rent-seeking contest in which n rms choose their expenditures se-
quentially, one after the other one. Dixit (1987) considers the value of
precommitment of e¤ort by heterogenous players, which can occur for
instance in a sequential-move contest. The problem of precommitment
of e¤ort appears also in Wärneryd (2000), who studies strategic dele-
gation in two-player contests. Baik, Cherry, Kroll and Shogren (1992),
Shogren and Baik (1992) and Weimann, Yang and Vogt (2000) study
experimentally the theoretical predictions of the sequential-move con-
test game theory. Other papers with similar focus as the ones about
sequential-move contest games are those related to the theory of tour-
naments. For instance, Jost and Kräkel (2005, 2006 and 2007) compare
contestantsstrategic behavior and study the principals optimal choice
of the prize spread in sequential-move and simultaneous-move tourna-
ments.
We formulated our contest model in general terms, which allows re-
ecting in a stylized way a variety of situations in which the imple-
mentation of a¢ rmative action can have consequences on the incentive
structure of e¤ort provision. Possible real world examples of contest-like
environments in which the e¤ect of the implementation of the a¢ rma-
tion action policy on the levels of exerted e¤ort may be an important
3Leininger (1993) uses a slightly di¤erent form of a utility function, which is an
a¢ ne transformation of ours. In terms of our current discussion a disadvantaged
agent is the one with lower valuation of the prize.
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issue cover for instance real corporate tournaments, such as sales con-
tests in which salesmen compete for a bonus. Discriminated workers
might get some type of limited advantage to guarantee a more balanced
competition. Moreover, in these contests often workers do not decide
perfectly simultaneously in a one-shot game. On the contrary, workers
can observe each other during a certain period in which the tournament
takes place and choose their e¤orts in sequence. Another example cov-
ers sport contests. In some of them, mainly amateur ones, advantaged
competitors are articially handicapped by the contest rule to guarantee
a level playing eld. In such cases there exist special systems of calcu-
lation of scores based on past players performance which allows players
of di¤erent prociency to play against each other on somewhat equal
terms. A more experienced player is disadvantaged in order to make it
possible for a less experienced player to participate in the game or sport
while maintaining fairness. Examples of this we can nd for instance
in golng, bowling or track and eld sports like showjumping, shotput,
broad jump, high jump and other. Moreover, all these sport contests
in practice are organized as sequential ones. A little di¤erent example
that comes from sports, but which also ts our discussion is the one
of ski-jumping. Here again, the competition takes place in a sequential
way. Although by the contest rule of this sport all players are treated
equally in terms of calculation of scores, clearly there exists some limited
advantage of skiers who jump earlier than later. This advantage comes
from the fact that the condition of the in-run tracks gets worse as more
skiers use it, so that the later players are handicapped. Those who are
handicapped are typically more experienced players, as by the contest
rules they jump later.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce our
model and present formal denitions of equal treatment and a¢ rmative
action policy. In Section 3 we perform the analysis of the total e¤ort
level for the two policy options under di¤erent scenarios of the order of
moves. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
A¢ rmative action instruments are typically employed in situations of
competitive social interaction. A convenient tool that can be used to
capture the competitive structure of these situations is a contest game
in which contestants compete for an indivisible prize. In this game, by
exerting more e¤ort the contestants can increase their respective prob-
ability of winning the contested prize, which reects the basic structure
of many situations of competitive social interaction. Moreover, there
exists a relatively high grade of discretion on the side of the competition
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organizer, which implies that contestants face a probabilistic outcome.
This property is also reected by a contest game model.
A distinguishing feature of our model relative to those already exist-
ing in the literature lies in the assumption on the timing of e¤ort level
decisions of contestants. In our version of a contest game model e¤ort
level decisions are made sequentially: a contestant (the follower) makes
his e¤ort level decision after his opponent (the leader) has already made
his.
To guarantee analytical tractability and closed form solutions, our
model is formulated under complete information, i.e. the only element
of uncertainty is the nal winner of the contest. In the paper we will use
the standard notion of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE).
2.1 Primitives
Let N = f1; 2g denote the set of risk-neutral individuals who compete
against each other in a sequential-move contest game. To win the con-
test, each contestant i 2 N exerts an e¤ort level ei 2 R+, while his
opponent a contestant j 2 N; i 6= j exerts an e¤ort level ej 2 R+. It
is assumed that both contestants have the same positive valuation V for
the contested prize. Apart from the timing of an e¤ort level decision,
the contestants di¤er in the respective "cost function" that captures the
disutility of exerting e¤ort ei. This function depends on a parameter i
that (potentially) reects the degree of discrimination of a contestant
i. It is assumed that for all i 2 N this cost function is linear in ei and
multiplicative in i, such that:
ci (ei) = iei: (1)
We assume also that the contestants are heterogenous in terms of their
marginal cost parameter and are ordered, such that 1 < 2, with nor-
malization 1 = 1. We denote 2 = .
The contestants perceive the outcome of the contest game as prob-
abilistic. However, they can inuence the probability of winning by
exerting e¤ort, which means that the outcome depends on the vector of
e¤ort levels exerted by both individuals. In our model we will employ
the following Contest Success Function (CSF) pi : R2+ ! [0; 1]:
pi(ei; ej) =
Pi ei
Pi ei + 
P
j ej
; for all i 2 N; (2)
with Pi > 0 for all i 2 N . This function maps the vector of e¤ort levels
(ei; ej) into win probabilities for each contestant. This is a restricted
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version of a CSF axiomatized in Clark and Riis (1998)4. This function
possesses a very convenient feature that allows an asymmetric treatment
of the contestants that can be interpreted as a¢ rmative action policy.
This is done by appropriate setting values of positive weights Pi , that
depend on the policy P , which will be dened formally in the next
section. If no contestant exerts positive e¤ort, it is assumed that none
of the individuals receives the prize, i.e. pi(0; 0) = 0 for all i 2 N 5.
A contestant i 2 N aims to maximize his expected utility, which,
given the cost function (1) and the contest mechanism (2), takes the
following (additive separable) form:
ui (ei; ej) = pi(ei; ej)V   iei: (3)
The contestants make their respective e¤ort decisions sequentially.
With respect to timing of these decisions we study two cases: one in
which the contestant who is less (or not) discriminated (the one with
lower marginal cost i, the stronger contestant) is the leader (moves
rst) (Case 1) and the other one in which he is the follower (moves
second) (Case 2). In both cases, the implemented policy option P is
announced to both contestants before the leaders move.
2.2 The Policy Options
In this section we describe two policy options P which later will be
compared in terms of total e¤ort levels that they generate6.
We assume that the choice of the policy P is based on the ethical
perception of the heterogeneity of the contestants (i.e. the di¤erent
marginal cost functions). This directly implies what is the normative
objective of the respective policy option and therefore determines the
individual e¤ort weights (Pi ; 
P
j ).
Two potential ethical interpretations that hold contestants ethically
responsible or not responsible for the source of the heterogeneity, lead to
4In Clark and Riis (1998) the CSF has the form pi(ei; ej) =
Pi e
r
i
Pi e
r
i+
P
j e
r
j
, for all
i 2 N , with r > 0. The parameter r measures the sensitivity of the outcome of the
contest game with respect to di¤erences in e¤ort. The assumption about r is needed
because for a non-linear CSF with a general parameter r > 0 it is not possible to
derive closed form solutions. As the existence of closed form solutions is crucial for
the comparative analysis of the policy alternatives, it is assumed that the CSF is
linear with r = 1. Also with a general parameter r > 0 the existence of pure strategy
equilibria cannot be guaranteed (see Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1994) for details).
With the restriction r = 1 all our equilibria are in pure strategies.
5Another convention in the contest-game literature is that pi(0; 0) = 12 for all i 2
N . The choice of either denition is not important in terms of the results that we
obtain in this paper.
6This section follows Franke (2007).
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two policy options: equal treatment policy (ET ) and a¢ rmative action
policy (AA). Equal treatment policy follows the interpretation that
the contestants are held ethically responsible for their respective cost
function, and in this case the probability to win the contest game (i.e.
the CSF) should only depend on the vector of exerted e¤ort. This means
that if a contestant i exerts the same e¤ort level as a contestant j, then
both contestants should win the contest game with the same probability.
Hence this policy option treats the contestants equally with respect to
their exerted e¤ort level.
Denition 1 A policy is called equal treatment approach (ET) if:
ei = ej ) pi(ei; ej) = pj(ei; ej) for all i 6= j.
For our CSF dened in (2) this denition implies that policy weights
must be equal for all players, that is
ETi = 
ET for all i 2 N:
Note that this policy postulates that the contest success function nei-
ther depends on the specic names nor on the exogenous characteristics
of the players, therefore it could also be interpreted as an anonymity
principle. However, the outcome, i.e. expected equilibrium utility, of
the contest game will be indirectly determined by the characteristics of
the players, as the weaker player will exert less e¤ort in equilibrium.
In turn, a¢ rmative action policy follows the interpretation that con-
testants cannot be held ethically responsible for their heterogeneity. This
can be justied, for instance, because it is the consequence of past dis-
crimination. In this case fairness requires that two contestants who face
equal disutility induced by the chosen e¤ort level (that could be di¤er-
ent) should have the same probability to win the contest game.
Denition 2 A policy is called a¢ rmative action (AA) if:
ci(ei) = cj(ej)) pi(ei; ej) = pj(ei; ej) for all i 6= j.
For our CSF dened in (2) this denition implies that policy weights
must satisfy for all players the following relation
AAi
i
=
AAj
j
for all i 6= j:
Given that the CSF is homogenous of degree zero, without loss of gen-
erality these weights can be normalized such that
AAi = i for all i 2 N:
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The AA policy generates thus a bias of the CSF in favor of discriminated
contestants in such a way that both contestants have the same proba-
bility of winning the contest whenever they face the same disutility of
e¤ort7.
In the following section we will carry out an analysis of the two
normative policy options by comparing an aggregated measure of total
e¤ort, i.e. the sum of equilibrium e¤ort that each policy induces. In sit-
uations in which a¢ rmative action is potentially implemented, using the
total equilibrium e¤ort as the standard of comparison seems to be ap-
propriate because it captures the notion of social loss (or gain)8. Hence,
the total equilibrium e¤ort can be interpreted here as a measure of "so-
cial e¢ ciency". For instance, in sport competitions it can be argued that
spectators are interested in the overall performance of all players because
ex-ante predictable sport competitions are usually perceived as boring.
Also in the corporate tournaments, where this kind of tournament acts
as an incentive device, the employer is obviously interested in high e¤ort
levels by all employees, irrespective of the identity of the nal winner.
The equilibrium e¤ort level of each contestant will depend on the
ex-ante announced policy parameter P and the standard of comparison
will therefore be expressed and denoted in the following way: EP =P
i2N e

i (P ) for P 2 fET;AAg. Additionally, this specication also
allows the analysis of individual choices of the contestants by comparing
equilibrium e¤ort for individual contestants.
3 Analysis
We start by solving our model by backward induction in a general case,
with a contestant i being the leader and a contestant j being the follower.
We rst look at optimal e¤ort level decision of a contestant j. Us-
ing the CSF in eq. (2), the expected utility function in eq. (3) for a
7It is worth noting that the results in terms of the e¤ects of AA policy may
depend on the interplay between the specication of the CSF in eq. (2) and how
the AA policy is implemented. Notice that if we use the CSF in a general form
pi(ei; ej) =
Pi e
r
i
Pi e
r
i+
P
j e
r
j
with r ! 0, then a limiting CSF is pi(ei; ej) = ii+j under
the AA policy, and pi(ei; ej) = 1#N (the fair lottery) under the ET policy. With such
CSFs the total e¤ort level will be zero and the results on the AA will be di¤erent.
8Comparing the e¤ect of the implementation of ET and AA policy in terms of
winning probabilities given by the CSF in eq. (2), we may notice that AA policy
aims at choosing the discriminated agent (with the higher marginal cost parameter
i) more often than ET policy. Therefore, other standard of comparison that we can
think of here could relate to the equilibrium win probabilities.
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contestant j given the policy option P 2 fET;AAg can be written as
uj (ei; ej) =
Pi ej
Pi ei + 
P
j ej
V   jej for j 2 N; i 6= j: (4)
The problem of a contestant j is to maximize this function with respect
to his non-negative e¤ort level ej, given a non-negative e¤ort level of a
contestant i, ei, and a policy parameter P . The rst order condition
yields
Pj 
P
i ei 
Pi ei + 
P
j ej
2V   j = 0;
which after considering a non-negativity constraint on the e¤ort level of
a contestant j produces
ej =
q
Pj 
P
i eiV   Pi ei
p
j
Pj
p
j
:
So the e¤ort level candidate of a contestant j given an e¤ort level of a
contestant i can be written as:
ej (ei)=
q
Pj 
P
i eiV   Pi ei
p
j
Pj
p
j
=
s
Pi
Pj
V
j
ei   
P
i
Pj
ei:
In some situations this equation can produce non-positive e¤ort levels.
This happens if q
Pj 
P
i eiV   Pi ei
q
j  0;
that is when
ei = 0 or ei 
Pj
Pi
V
j
: (5)
As the e¤ort level of a contestant j is constrained to be non-negative,
it follows that in all such cases in which the condition (5) is satised,
his e¤ort level is zero. Note however, that a situation in which both
contestants exert e¤ort at a zero level cannot be equilibrium. Then a
very small increase in an e¤ort level of one of the contestants makes him
win the game with certainty with positive pay-o¤. Therefore we may
omit the case of ei = 0 in our further analysis, without losing generality.
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With this, the solution of maximization problem of a contestant j
given an e¤ort level of a contestant i becomes
ej (ei) =
8><>:
r
Pi
Pj
V
j
ei   
P
i
Pj
ei; if ei <
Pj
Pi
V
j
;
0; if ei  
P
j
Pi
V
j
:
(6)
The second order condition for a contestant j yields
@2uj (ei; ej)
@e2j
=   2
P
i ei
 
Pj
2 
Pi ei + 
P
j ej
3V < 0;
which proves concavity, as long as an e¤ort level of a contestant i is
strictly positive. As we will show later in our analysis, this is in fact
true. Thus the maximum exists and is unique.
Now we turn to the maximization problem of the leader, a contestant
i. Using the CSF in eq. (2), the expected utility function in eq. (3) for
a contestant i given the policy option P 2 fET;AAg can be written as
ui (ei; ej (ei)) =
Pi ei
Pi ei + 
P
j ej (ei)
V   iei for i 2 N; i 6= j; (7)
where ej (ei) denotes a best reply function of a contestant j given in (6).
Consider rst a case of ei <
Pj
Pi
V
j
. A contestant j exerts then an
e¤ort at a positive level, and his best reply function ej (ei) is given by
the rst-line expression in (6). With this the rst order condition for a
contestant i yields
1
2
s
Pi
Pj
jV
ei
  i = 0;
whose only solution is
ei =
Pi
Pj
jV
42i
: (8)
Notice, that an e¤ort level given by this solution is always strictly posi-
tive. It follows, that in this case both contestants: a contestant i being
the leader and a contestant j being the follower are active in a game.
In a case of ei  
P
j
Pi
V
j
, by (6) a contestant j exerts an e¤ort at a
zero level and his best reply function is ej (ei) = 0. Then a contestant i
wins the game with certainty. As exerting e¤ort causes disutility, by eq.
(7) a maximization problem of a contestant i just requires to minimize
a level of his exerted e¤ort over its domain, which produces
ei =
Pj
Pi
V
j
; (9)
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and which is of course always positive. It follows, that in this case a
contestant i the leader is active in a game and a contestant j the
follower is not.
Note, that by plugging an e¤ort level given in eq. (8) into the con-
dition ei <
Pj
Pi
V
j
, we obtain that this e¤ort level satises the condition
whenever
2Pj i   Pi j > 0.
This result implies that the condition ei  
P
j
Pi
V
j
may be expressed as
2Pj i   Pi j  0.
As our discussion showed, these two last conditions, jointly written
as
2Pj i   Pi j T 0; (10)
determine whether contestants are playing a game in which both the
leader and the follower exert e¤ort at a positive level that is both
are active or whether they are playing a game in which only the leader
is active and the follower is not. To understand better their meaning we
rewrite (10) in relative terms, which produces
2
Pj
Pi
T
j
i
; (11)
where
Pj
Pi
is the followers relative policy weight and
j
i
is the followers
relative marginal cost with respect to the leader. The expression (11)
reveals that what really matters in terms of the equilibrium type with
one or two contestants active  is the relation between the followers
relative policy weight and his relative marginal cost. To interpret, x the
values of the leaders policy weight Pi and marginal cost parameter i.
Fix also for a moment the followers cost parameter j. If the followers
relative policy weight is big enough, such that the LHS of the expression
(11) is strictly greater that the its RHS, then 2Pj i Pi j > 0 holds and
by our previous discussion contestants are playing a game in which both
are active. This requires Pj be big enough. However, when the opposite
holds that is the followers relative policy weight is small enough, such
that the LHS of the expression (11) is less than or equal to its RHS,
then 2Pj i   Pi j  0 holds and, as our previous analysis showed,
contestants are playing a game in which the follower is not active. This
requires Pj be small enough. Note that increasing the value of the
followers cost parameter j, shifts upwards his relative marginal cost.
As a result of this increase, the minimal level of the leaders policy weight
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Pi , which is necessary for the LHS of the expression (11) to be greater
than its LHS and which guarantees that both agents are active in a
game, goes up.
It follows from our analysis, that the solution of the maximization
problem of a contestant i is
ei =
8<:
Pi j
4Pj 
2
i
V; if 2Pj i   Pi j > 0;
Pj
Pi j
V; if 2Pj i   Pi j  0:
(12)
The second order condition for a contestant i yields
@2ui (ei; ej)
@e2i
=  
q
Pi jV
4
q
Pj e
3
i
< 0;
which proves concavity. Hence the maximum exists and is unique.
It follows from our analysis, that there exists a unique equilibrium,
in which a contestant i the leader always exerts positive e¤ort, and
a contestant j the followerexerts e¤ort at a non-negative level. By
eq. (12), and by eq. (6) after plugging into it corresponding values of
eq. (12), those equilibrium e¤ort levels given the policy option P are8><>:
ei (P ) =
Pi j
4Pj 
2
i
V
ej (P ) =
Pi (2Pj i Pi j)
4(Pj )
2
2i
V
, if 2Pj i   Pi j > 0, (13)
and (
ei (P ) =
Pj
Pi j
V
ej (P ) = 0
, if 2Pj i   Pi j  0: (14)
Using eq. (13) and (14) the equilibrium sum of e¤ort levels given the
policy option P admits
EP =
8><>:
Pi (Pj (2i+j) Pi j)
4(Pj )
2
2i
V; if 2Pj i   Pi j > 0;
Pj
Pi j
V; if 2Pj i   Pi j  0:
(15)
Similarly, the equilibrium expected utility levels given the policy op-
tion P admit8><>:
ui
 
ei (P ) ; e

j (P )

=
Pi j
4Pj i
V
uj
 
ei (P ) ; e

j (P )

=
(2Pj i Pi j)
2
4(Pj )
2
2i
V
, if 2Pj i   Pi j > 0; (16)
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and (
ui
 
ei (P ) ; e

j (P )

=
Pi j Pj i
Pi j
V
uj
 
ei (P ) ; e

j (P )

= 0
, if 2Pj i   Pi j  0: (17)
Now we are going to compare the two policy options using as a stan-
dard of comparison the sum of equilibrium e¤ort levels. We will also look
at individual e¤ort decisions of contestants, which will help us to under-
stand better mechanisms that lead to changes in the sum of equilibrium
e¤ort levels under di¤erent policy options.
Contestant 1 is assumed to be the one with a lower marginal cost
parameter such that 1 = 1 (we will call him "the stronger contestant"),
and contestant 2 the one with a marginal cost parameter 2 =  > 1
("the weaker contestant"). Note that Denitions 1 and 2 imply that the
bias for contestant 1 is normalized to P1 = 1 for P 2 fET;AAg, and for
contestant 2 is ET2 = 1 and 
AA
2 = . In our comparisons we consider
two cases: Case 1 in which contestant 1 is the leader and contestant 2 is
the follower (i = 1; j = 2 in our general solution), and Case 2 in which
this order of moves is reversed (i = 2; j = 1 in the solution).
In the following we present our results related to the comparison
of the two policy options using as a standard of comparison the sum of
equilibrium e¤ort levels. For clarity of presentation, the detailed analysis
and comparison of the individual e¤ort levels are delegated to Appendix.
3.1 Case 1
We begin our analysis with the case, in which contestant 1 is the leader.
Proposition 1 In a sequential-move game in which the stronger con-
testant is the leader, if  < 3 ( > 3) the total equilibrium e¤ort level
of contestants is lower (higher) under the a¢ rmative action policy than
under the equal treatment policy option, and if  = 3, both policy op-
tions produce the same level of the total equilibrium e¤ort. This can be
summarized as
EET T EAA, if  S 3, respectively.
Proof. Setting i = 1, j = 2 and using corresponding values of policy
weights Pi and marginal cost parameter i (i 2 N) in eq. (15) we nd
that
EET =

1
2
V; if  < 2;
1

V; if  2:
and
EAA =
 + 1
4
V:
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To prove the proposition we need to show that for  < 2 the inequality
1
2
V >
 + 1
4
V , (18)
and for   2 the inequality
1

V T  + 1
4
V , (19)
if  < 3,  = 3 and  > 3, respectively, are satised.
Consider rst the case of case of  < 2, given by the inequality (18).
Using some algebra, within the domain of V > 0 and  > 0, we obtain
that this inequality reduces to
 > 1,
which is satised in our model by assumption. It follows, that the in-
equality (18) is always true for  2 (1; 2).
In the second case, if   2, within the domain of V > 0 and  > 0,
the inequality given in (19) reduces to
 S 3,
which is exactly the conditions on  in our claim.
It follows from Proposition 1 that in a sequential-move game in which
the stronger player is the leader, the implementation of the a¢ rmative
action policy option may have detrimental e¤ect on the total equilib-
rium e¤ort level of players, as compared to the level under the equal
treatment policy option. In a particular case, the existence of this e¤ect
depends on a marginal cost level of the follower. If players are rather
homogenous in terms of their marginal cost of e¤ort, then the imple-
mentation of the a¢ rmative action policy option leads in equilibrium
to drop in the total e¤ort level of contestants with respect to the level
under the equal treatment policy option. The opposite happens if play-
ers are very heterogenous - in such a case the total equilibrium e¤ort
level of contestants increases. This result is in contrast to the ones that
we can nd in the economic literature. In particular, in a similar study
but assuming that players move simultaneously, Franke (2007) showed
that the implementation of the a¢ rmative action policy option is always
enhancing the total equilibrium e¤ort level. We show that this doesnt
have to be true in a more general case. When players are allowed to
move sequentially, then it may happen that the total equilibrium e¤ort
level will be lower under the a¢ rmative action policy option than under
the equal treatment policy option. Moreover, Franke (2007)s result is
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not dependent on the marginal cost parameter of players. We show that
if we consider possibility of sequential moves, then levels of marginal
cost of players become an important factor in assessing the e¤ects of the
policy change.
Apart from studying the total equilibrium e¤ort level, it is interesting
to look at its ingredients, that is individual e¤ort decisions of contestants.
It allows us to understand deeper various mechanisms that govern the
behavior of players under di¤erent policy options and lead to the changes
in the total equilibrium e¤ort level. Proposition 7 and Proposition 8 in
Appendix provide results on comparison of individual e¤ort levels of both
players in Case 1 under the two policy options. Using those propositions
we may try to explain the mechanisms that lead to the result given in
Proposition 1. By Proposition 8, the follower always benets from the
change of the policy from the equal treatment to the a¢ rmative action
option and increases his equilibrium e¤ort level. However, the leaders
reaction to the policy change is more complex. The leader exerts in
equilibrium e¤ort at a higher level under a¢ rmative action policy if
 > 4, and at a lower one if  < 4. If  = 4 his equilibrium e¤ort level
is the same in both cases. Hence, under a¢ rmative action policy for
 > 4 in equilibrium both contestants exert e¤ort at a higher level and
for  = 4 the follower exerts e¤ort at a higher level and the leader at
the same level as under the equal treatment policy option. This implies
that if   4 the total equilibrium e¤ort level is higher under a¢ rmative
action policy than under equal treatment policy. In turn, for  < 4
under a¢ rmative action policy the follower exerts in equilibrium e¤ort
at a higher level and the leader at a lower level. Then if  < 3 and the
policy option changes, in equilibrium the size of the drop in an e¤ort
level of the leader is bigger that the size of the increase in an e¤ort level
of the follower, which results in the total equilibrium e¤ort level lower
under a¢ rmative action policy than under equal treatment policy. In
turn, for  2 (3; 4) in equilibrium the size of the drop in an e¤ort level
of the leader is lower that the size of the increase in an e¤ort level of
the follower, which results in the total equilibrium e¤ort level higher
under a¢ rmative action policy than under equal treatment policy. For
 = 3, in equilibrium the drop in the e¤ort level of the leader is exactly
compensated by the increase in the e¤ort level of the follower, so that
the total equilibrium e¤ort level of contestants doesnt change.
3.2 Case 2
Now we study the case in which contestant 1 is the follower.
Proposition 2 In a sequential-move game in which the stronger con-
testant is the follower, the total equilibrium e¤ort level of contestants is
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higher under the a¢ rmative action policy than under the equal treatment
policy option, that is
EET < E

AA:
Proof. Setting i = 2, j = 1 and using corresponding values of policy
weights Pi and marginal cost parameter i (i 2 N) in eq. (15) we nd
that
EET =
1
2
V
and
EAA =
 + 1
4
V .
We need to show that EET < E

AA is satised in our model, that is
that for all  > 1 the inequality
1
2
V <
 + 1
4
V (20)
is true.
Using some algebra, within the domain of V > 0 and  > 0, we
obtain that the inequality given in (20) reduces to
 > 1,
which is satised in our model by assumption.
It follows from Proposition 2 that in a sequential-move game in which
the weaker player is the leader, the implementation of the a¢ rmative
action policy option, has always positive e¤ect on the total equilibrium
e¤ort level of players, as compared to the level under the equal treatment
policy option. Moreover, this result shows again that the order of moves
of contestants in a game matters. When we reverse the order of moves
with respect to the one in Case 1, the e¤ect of the policy change in terms
of the total equilibrium e¤ort level of contestants is no longer dependent
on the value of the marginal cost parameter of the weaker player . For
any admissible value of this parameter this e¤ect is positive.
As in Case 1, in order to be able to understand which mechanisms
lead to the changes in the total equilibrium e¤ort level, it is useful to
look at individual e¤ort decisions of contestants. Proposition 9 and
Proposition 10 in Appendix provide results on comparison of individual
e¤ort levels of both players in Case 2 under the two policy options. Using
those propositions, it is easy to explain the mechanisms that lead to the
result given in Proposition 2. By Proposition 9 and Proposition 10, both
contestants in equilibrium benet from the change of the policy from the
equal treatment to the a¢ rmative action option, and increase their e¤ort
levels. This implies that the total equilibrium e¤ort rises, which is the
result stated in Proposition 2.
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Case 1 (1!2) Case 2 (2!1) Case 3 (1$2)
e1(ET )
e2(ET )
 
4
V; if < 2,
1

V; if  2,
2 
4
V; if < 2,
0; if  2,
2 1
42
V
1
42
V

(+1)2
V
1
(+1)2
V
e1(AA)
e2(AA)
1
4
V
1
4
V
1
4
V
1
4
V
1
4
V
1
4
V
EET

1
2
V; if  < 2;
1

V; if  2;
1
2
V 1
+1
V
EAA
+1
4
V +1
4
V +1
4
V
Table 1: Summary of the results on the equilibrium e¤ort levels
Case 1 (1!2) Case 2 (2!1) Case 3 (1$2)
u1 (e

1(ET ); e

2(ET ))
u2 (e

1(ET ); e

2(ET ))
 
4
V; if < 2,
 1

V; if  2,
(2 )2
4
V; if < 2,
0; if  2,
(2 1)2
42
V
1
4
V
2
(+1)2
V
1
(+1)2
V
u1 (e

1(AA); e

2(AA))
u2 (e

1(AA); e

2(AA))
1
4
V
1
4
V
1
4
V
1
4
V
1
4
V
1
4
V
Table 2: Summary of the results on the equilibrium utility levels
3.3 Case 1 vs Case 2
In this section our objective is to compare Case 1 and Case 2 in terms of
the total e¤ort levels that they generate. Additionally, to highlight re-
lations between sequential-move and simultaneous-move games, we con-
sider in our analysis Case 3, in which contestants make their e¤ort level
decisions simultaneously. To make our current analysis easier, we sum-
marized all the results relevant to this section in Table 1 and Table 2.
For a sequential-move game, formulas in Table 1 were derived using eq.
(13), (14) and (15), by setting i = 1 and j = 2 for Case 1, and i = 2
and j = 1 for Case 2, and using corresponding values of policy weights
Pi and marginal cost parameter i (i 2 N). The same procedure was
used to nd formulas in Table 2, using eq. (16) and (17). Additionally,
in both tables we computed corresponding formulas related to Case 3 
a simultaneous-move contest (see Franke (2007) for details).
We begin our analysis in this section by comparing the three Cases
in terms of the total equilibrium e¤ort level of contestants that they
generate under the equal treatment policy option.
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Proposition 3 Under equal treatment policy, the highest level of the
total equilibrium e¤ort is generated when the stronger contestant is the
leader (Case 1), and the lowest level when he is the follower (Case 2) in
a sequential-move game. The level of the total equilibrium e¤ort when the
contestants move simultaneously (Case 3) is (strictly) in-between those
produced by Case 1 and 2. It may be summarized as9
EET;2 < E

ET;3 < E

ET;1:
Proof. According to Table 1, under equal treatment policy, the level of
the total equilibrium e¤ort in each Case is
EET;1=

1
2
V; if  < 2;
1

V; if  2;
EET;2=
1
2
V;
EET;3=
1
 + 1
V:
So to prove the proposition we need to show that for  > 1 the inequality
1
2
V <
1
 + 1
V , (21)
and for  < 2 the inequality
1
 + 1
V <
1
2
V , (22)
and for   2 the inequality
1
 + 1
V <
1

V , (23)
are satised.
Consider rst the inequality (21). Within the domain of V > 0 and
 > 0, this inequality reduces to
 > 1,
which is satised in our model by assumption. It follows, that the in-
equality (21) is always true for  > 1.
9To distinguish the total e¤ort levels related to di¤erent Cases in our notation we
add additional subscript which denotes the number of Case (1,2 or 3). EP;k denotes
the total equilibrium e¤ort level of contestants in Case k given a policy option P .
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Consider now the inequality (22), for  < 2. Within the domain of
V > 0 and  > 0, this inequality reduces to
 > 1,
which is satised in our model by assumption. It follows, that the in-
equality (22) is always true for  2 (1; 2).
Finally consider the inequality (23), for   2. Within the domain
of V > 0 and  > 0, this inequality reduces to
1 > 0,
which is always true. It follows, that the inequality (23) is always satis-
ed for   2.
It follows from Proposition 3 that the highest level of the total equi-
librium e¤ort is generated when the stronger contestant is the leader
and the lowest when he is the follower in a sequential-move game. The
total equilibrium e¤ort level in a simultaneous-move game is exactly
in-between those of a sequential-move game.
Now, we are going to consider the total e¤ort levels that are generated
under a¢ rmative action policy.
Proposition 4 Under a¢ rmative action policy, in a sequential-move
game the level of the equilibrium e¤ort for each contestant when the
stronger contestant is the leader (Case 1) is the same as when he is the
follower (Case 2). Moreover, those common levels of the contestants
equilibrium e¤ort in a sequential-move game are equal to the levels of
the contestants equilibrium e¤ort in a simultaneous-move game (Case
3). This result also implies that in all three cases the level of the total
equilibrium e¤ort is the same. Hence,
ei;1(AA) = e

i;2(AA) = e

i;3(AA) := e

i;1 3(AA) for i 2 N 10;
and
EAA;1 = E

AA;2 = E

AA;3 := E

AA;1 3.
Proof. According to Table 1, under a¢ rmative action policy, the levels
of the equilibrium e¤ort for each contestant in each Case are
ei;1(AA)=

e1 =
1
4
V;
e2 =
1
4
V;
ei;2(AA)=

e1 =
1
4
V;
e2 =
1
4
V;
ei;3(AA)=

e1 =
1
4
V;
e2 =
1
4
V:
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We see that for each contestant they are equal. This result also implies
that the level of the total equilibrium e¤ort is the same in each Case,
that is
EAA;1=
 + 1
4
V;
EAA;2=
 + 1
4
V;
EAA;3=
 + 1
4
V;
which is also conrmed by data in Table 1.
Proposition 4 highlights the essence of a¢ rmative action policy in
terms of e¤ort levels. As a result of implementation of a¢ rmative action
policy, the order of moves in a game is no longer important. Across the
three Cases an equilibrium e¤ort level of a given contestant and conse-
quently the total equilibrium e¤ort level are the same. This result also
implies that under a¢ rmative action policy in all three Cases a given
player has in equilibrium the same expected utility level. However, after
more detailed analysis, it turns out that equilibrium expected utility lev-
els are equal not only across Cases for a given contestant but also across
contestants (see Table 2). This means that a¢ rmative action policy,
which formally is equalizing probability to win the contest game if con-
testants face the same disutility induced by the chosen e¤ort level (that
could be di¤erent), induces in equilibrium equalization of the expected
utility level across contestants. So, although contestants are di¤erent
in terms of their marginal cost parameter, their expected payo¤ is the
same.
The intuition behind the results in Proposition 4 is the following:
the change from equal treatment policy to the a¢ rmative action policy
option makes an "asymmetric" ex ante game "symmetric" in the sense
that under a¢ rmative action policy two heterogenous players are treated
as if they were homogenous. Dixit (1987), Leininger (1993) and Wärn-
eryd (2000) show that the homogeneity of players leads to the symmetric
simultaneous-move outcomes in a game where players choose their e¤orts
sequentially. Homogeneity is understood there as the fact that players
have the same valuations of the prize11 and the same level of the mar-
ginal cost of e¤ort. In our model, before and after the implementation
of a¢ rmative action policy players are heterogenous because they di¤er
11In Leininger (1993) the same valuation of the prize is understood as the fact that
the valuation of one agent is equal to the valuation of other agent multiplied by some
constant. This constant accounts for some di¤erences in the way agents are treated
by the contest rule, which is similar to what we have in our model.
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in terms of their marginal cost of e¤ort. However, as a result of the
policy implemented they are treated by the contest rules as if they were
homogenous in its terms.
Using our results we may compare the total equilibrium e¤ort levels
generated under the two policy options and in di¤erent Cases. However,
before proceeding we need to state a supplementary result, related to
the simultaneous-move case (Case 3).
Lemma 1 In a simultaneous-move contest game (Case 3), the total
equilibrium e¤ort level is always higher under the a¢ rmative action pol-
icy option than under the equal treatment policy option. This result can
be summarized as
EET;3 < E

AA;3.
Proof. See Franke (2007).
Lemma 1 means that in a simultaneous-move contest game (Case 3),
the total equilibrium e¤ort level is always higher under the a¢ rmative
action policy option than under the equal treatment policy option.
Now, using Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4 and Lemma 1 we may rank the total
equilibrium e¤ort levels exerted by contestants in di¤erent situations.
Conclusion 1 The total equilibrium e¤ort level of the contestants sat-
ises the following relations:
EET;2 < E

ET;3 <

EET;1; E

AA;1 3
	
and
EET;1 T EAA;1 3, if  S 3, respectively.
3.4 Optimality of A¢ rmative Action Policy
As our analysis reveals, given the order of moves of contestants and their
marginal cost of e¤ort, the implementation of a¢ rmative action policy
may have positive or negative e¤ect in terms of the total e¤ort level of
contestants. We showed in particular, that in a two-player contest game,
as the response to the implementation of the a¢ rmative action policy op-
tion, the total e¤ort level of individuals may decrease in comparison with
the unbiased contest game. This happens when the non-discriminated
individual moves before the discriminated one and the underlying het-
erogeneity of individuals is not too severe. However, when the underlying
heterogeneity of individuals is very severe or both individuals move in
the reversed order, then the e¤ect of the a¢ rmative action policy option
on the total equilibrium e¤ort level is always positive.
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It follows that the interplay of the order of moves of contestants, of
their marginal cost of e¤ort and of the type of the policy option that
is implemented may have various e¤ects on the total e¤ort level. As
it was assumed earlier, the contest organizer aims only at maximizing
the total equilibrium e¤ort level exerted by the contestants, therefore
it is interesting to study this interplay from his point of view. In this
section, using the total e¤ort level as a measure of the contest organizers
utility, we will try to examine in particular under which circumstances
he prefers the implementation of the a¢ rmative action policy option to
the equal treatment policy option.
While studying the contest organizers problem of the choice of the
policy we will consider two cases with the exogenously and endoge-
nously determined order of moves of the individuals. In both cases the
contest organizer can decide whether to implement the a¢ rmative ac-
tion policy option or not. As far as the exogenous order of moves is
concerned, the contest organizer can always make the contestants move
in specied order. In terms of the choice of this order we will consider
here two mechanisms: one in which the order is given to the contest or-
ganizer exogenously12 and the other in which the contest organizer can
specify this order on his own13, that is can decide whether the game will
be a simultaneous or sequential-move contest and determine the order
of moves of contestants in the latter one. As far as the endogenous order
of moves is concerned, the contest organizer is not able to specify the
order of moves in detail but can design the contest conditions such that
moving sequentially or simultaneously might be possible14.
12Real life examples of situations in which the order of moves is exogenous for both
the players and the contest organizer can be found for instance in many professional
sports, where it is specied by the contest rules. In professional ski-jumping, more
experienced players jump by the contest rules later. This makes them handicapped
in comparison to the earlier players as the in-run tracks gets worse as more skiers use
it.
13For instance in some more o¢ cial amateur sport events, such as some amateur
golng competition, the order of players moves may be determined by the event
organizers and therefore be exogenous for the players. As we noted in Introduction,
in golng the a¢ rmative action policy is an issue, since typically to guarantee a level
playing eld advantaged competitors are articially handicapped by the contest rule.
14Real life examples of situations in which players choose their order of moves
can be found for instance in amateur sports such as amateur golng. Here, before
he actual play, players may agree on this order between themselves. As we noted
earlier, in this example the a¢ rmative action policy is an issue, since typically to
guarantee a level playing eld advantaged competitors are articially handicapped
by the contest rule.
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3.4.1 Exogenous Order of Moves
The case in which the individualsmoves are given exogenously, that is
are determined by the contest organizer, coincides with all our analysis
which we have performed so far. This analysis is based on an implicit
assumption that the order of moves was predetermined. In this section
we want to supplement it by explicitly stating under which conditions
the contest organizer prefers implementation of the a¢ rmative action
policy option to the equal treatment policy option.
In this section we will assume that the contest organizer can make
contestants move in specied order according to Case 1, 2 or 3. However,
in terms of the choice of a given Case to implement, we will consider here
two situations in which the contest organizer can select a specic Case
to apply. We will call it respectively "full specication" and "partial
specication" of the order of moves. In the "full specication" case
the number of a Case to implement is chosen by the contest organizer,
whereas in the "partial specication" this number is given to the contest
organizer exogenously. That is, in the "full specication" case the contest
organizer selects one of the three Cases, which would maximize his utility,
given that he will make decision about whether to apply a¢ rmative
action policy or not. In the case of the "partial specication", he cannot
select any of the Cases on his own the case to implement is given to
him exogenously and the only decision that he can make now is the one
about whether to employ a¢ rmative action policy or not.
We look rst at the preferences of the contest organizer, given a Case
that is when the order of moves is specied partially.
Proposition 5 If the contest organizer is able to specify the order of
moves in a contest partially, then
(i) in a case in which the stronger contestant is the follower (Case
2) in a sequential-move game, or when the contestants move si-
multaneously (Case 3), he always prefers the implementation of
the a¢ rmative action policy option to the equal treatment policy
option; and
(ii) in a case in which the stronger contestant is the leader (Case 1)
in a sequential-move game, if  > 3 ( < 3) the contest organizer
prefers (doesnt prefer) the implementation of the a¢ rmative ac-
tion policy option to the equal treatment policy option, and  = 3
he is indi¤erent between the two policy options.
Proof. Note rst, that given that the total equilibrium e¤ort level of
the contestants is a measure of utility of the contest organizer, to prove
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the proposition it is enough to compare corresponding levels of the total
equilibrium e¤ort.
Lets start with the part (i) of the proposition. By Proposition 2
for a game in which the stronger contestant is the follower (Case 2),
and by Lemma 1 for a simultaneous-move contest game (Case 3), under
the a¢ rmative action policy option the total equilibrium e¤ort level
of contestants is always higher than under the equal treatment policy
option. This implies that in both cases the contest organizer always
prefers the implementation of the a¢ rmative action policy option to the
equal treatment policy option.
Consider now the part (ii) of the proposition. By Proposition 1, if
the stronger contestant is the leader in a sequential-move game (Case
1), for  < 3 ( > 3) under the a¢ rmative action policy option the
total equilibrium e¤ort level of contestants is lower (higher) than under
the equal treatment policy option, and for  = 3, both policy options
produce the same level of the total equilibrium e¤ort. This implies that
if  > 3 ( < 3) then the contest organizer prefers (doesnt prefer)
the implementation of the a¢ rmative action policy option to the equal
treatment policy option, and if  = 3 he is indi¤erent between the two
policy options.
Proposition 5 states that when the weaker contestant is the leader
(Case 2) in a sequential-move game, or when the contestants move si-
multaneously (Case 3), then the contest organizer always prefers the
implementation of a¢ rmative action policy to equal treatment policy.
In Case 1, in which the stronger contestant is the leader, the preference
for a¢ rmative action policy depends on the marginal cost parameter of
the weaker contestant , which is a direct consequence of Proposition 1.
Now, we will be assuming that the contest organizer can specify the
order of moves fully, that is he is able both to make contestants move
in specied order according to Case 1, 2 or 3, and to choose the number
of a Case.
Conclusion 2 If the contest organizer is able to specify fully the order
of moves in a contest, then he will maximize his utility by setting a
contest in which the stronger contestant is the leader (Case 1). In this
case if  > 3 ( < 3) the contest organizer prefers (doesnt prefer)
the implementation of the a¢ rmative action policy option to the equal
treatment policy option, and  = 3 he is indi¤erent between the two
policy options.
This result is a direct consequence of Conclusion 1. In a situation, in
which the order of moves can be determined fully, the contest organizer
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will always choose Case 1. Moreover, he will implement the a¢ rma-
tive policy only if contestants are heterogenous enough in terms of their
marginal cost of e¤ort.
3.4.2 Endogenous Order of Moves
In the following we will consider a situation in which the contest or-
ganizer is not able to specify the order of moves in a contest in detail
but can design the contest conditions such that moving sequentially or
simultaneously might be possible. The individuals then decide whether
or not to move sequentially and in which order. The central question
then is under which circumstances the contest organizer prefers imple-
mentation of the a¢ rmative action policy option to the equal treatment
policy option.
To start the analysis we rst investigate how the individuals coor-
dinate on the order of moves in case the contest organizer allows the
possibility for a simultaneous or sequential-move contest. We will as-
sume that the following game is played: Both agents choose and publicly
announce the stage in which they will exert e¤ort. Hence, each agent
can either choose stage 1 to be the leader or stage 2 to act as the fol-
lower. These choices are done simultaneously. Moreover, the agents are
strictly committed to their choices. There are three possible outcomes.
Either the stronger contestant announces stage 1 and his opponent stage
2 so that we have a sequential-move contest with the leader being the
stronger contestant, or he announces stage 2 and his opponent stage 1
so that we have a sequential-move game with reversed order, or both in-
dividuals announce the same stage so that we have a simultaneous-move
contest.
Lemma 2 If the contest organizer is not able to specify the order of
moves in a contest, under the equal treatment policy option the equilib-
rium order of moves is the one in which the leader is the weaker contes-
tant (Case 2).
Proof. See Leininger (1993)15.
So, if the contest organizer is not able to specify the order of moves
in a contest, then contestants will move according to the order as in Case
2, in which the leader is the weaker contestant. With this result we can
state now our result about the optimality of a¢ rmative action policy for
the contest organizer.
15Leininger (1993) uses a slightly di¤erent form of a utility function, which is an
a¢ ne transformation of ours. His and our model are equivalent for the Proof by
setting in the Leininger (1993)s model a = 1; Vx = V and Vy = V .
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Proposition 6 If the contest organizer is not able to specify the order
of moves in a contest, then he always prefers the implementation of the
a¢ rmative action policy option to the equal treatment policy option.
Proof. Note rst, that given that the total equilibrium e¤ort level of the
contestants is a measure of utility of the contest organizer, to prove the
proposition it is enough to show that the total equilibrium e¤ort level is
always higher under the a¢ rmative action policy option than under the
equal treatment policy option.
By Lemma 2, if the contest organizer is not able to specify the or-
der of moves in a contest, then under the equal treatment policy option
the equilibrium order of moves is the one in which the leader is the
weaker contestant, as in Case 2. By Proposition 2, in Case 2 under
the a¢ rmative action policy option the total equilibrium e¤ort level of
the contestants is higher than under the equal treatment policy option.
Moreover, by Proposition 4, under this policy option the total equilib-
rium e¤ort level in Case 2 is the same as the one in Case 1 and Case 3.
All this implies that independently of the order of moves, that the con-
testants will choose under the a¢ rmative action policy option, always
this policy yields a higher total equilibrium e¤ort level than the equal
treatment policy option.
By the result given in Proposition 6 the implementation of a¢ rma-
tive action policy is the most preferred option for the contest organizer,
whenever he is not able to specify the order of moves in a game.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, using a version of a rent-seeking sequential-move game in
the style of Tullock (1980) with heterogeneous players, we studied how
individuals react to the changes in incentives that are induced by the
two policies - equal treatment policy and a¢ rmative action policy. Our
main point of interest was the e¤ect of the changes on e¤ort provision,
both at the individual and total level.
Using our model we showed that the order of moves of contestants
is a very important factor in the determination of the e¤ects of the
implementation of a¢ rmative action policy. We also proved that in such
cases a signicant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of
individuals. In particular, contrary to Franke (2007), it is shown that in
a two-player contest game, as the response to the implementation of the
a¢ rmative action policy option, the total equilibrium e¤ort level of the
contestants may decrease in comparison to the unbiased contest game.
This happens when the non-discriminated individual moves before the
discriminated one and the underlying heterogeneity of individuals is not
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too severe. In such a case the optimal response of the leader to the
implementation of the a¢ rmative action policy option is to decrease
his optimal e¤ort level, and although the e¤ect of the policy change
for the discriminated player is in this case always positive, as a result,
the sum of the equilibrium e¤ort levels of both individuals decreases.
However, when the underlying heterogeneity of individuals is very severe
or both individuals move in the reversed order, then the e¤ect of the
a¢ rmative action policy option on the total equilibrium e¤ort level is
always positive, as in Franke (2007). In such a case, as the optimal
response to the implementation of the a¢ rmative action policy option,
both the leader and the follower increase their respective e¤ort levels,
which produces the rise in the total equilibrium e¤ort level.
In our analysis, apart from considering the e¤ects of the imple-
mentation of a¢ rmative action policy given the order of moves, we
also compared the games with di¤erent orders of moves, including the
simultaneous-move one, given the policy option: the equal treatment or
the a¢ rmative action. This part of our analysis revealed that under the
a¢ rmative action policy option the order of moves is irrelevant. In this
situation, independently of the order of moves, each individual exerts
his e¤ort at the same level, which implies that the total e¤ort level is
always the same.
As a part of our analysis we also studied preferences of the contest
organizer for the two policy options, assuming that he is purely inter-
ested in maximizing the total e¤ort level exerted by the contestants. We
showed that if the order of moves is determined endogenously by the
players, then the contest organizer always prefers the implementation of
a¢ rmative action policy to equal treatment policy. In such a situation,
the equilibrium order of moves is the one in which the discriminated indi-
vidual moves before the non-discriminated one and, as we noticed earlier,
the implementation of a¢ rmative action policy produces then the rise
in the total equilibrium e¤ort level of the contestants. These preferences
are somehow changed if specied order of moves is exogenous for the
players and the contest organizer is able to make them move according
to this order. We distinguished here two cases: one in which this order
is given to the contest organizer exogenously and the other in which the
contest organizer can specify it, including the simultaneous-move one, on
his own. When the order of moves is exogenous for the contest organizer,
then he always prefers the implementation of a¢ rmative action policy
to equal treatment policy in all cases of this order but the one in which
the non-discriminated individual moves before the discriminated one. In
this particular situation he may sometimes prefer the implementation of
equal treatment policy to a¢ rmative action policy. This happens when
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the underlying heterogeneity of the individuals is not too severe. The
same particular order of moves emerges as the one which maximizes the
utility of the contest organizer in the second case when the contest or-
ganizer is able to specify the order of moves in a game on his own. And
here again, he prefers the implementation of equal treatment policy to
a¢ rmative action policy only if the individuals are not too heterogenous.
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Appendix
In the main part of our paper we concentrated on di¤erent results re-
lated to the comparison of the two policy options using as a standard
of comparison the sum of equilibrium e¤ort levels. However, apart from
studying the total equilibrium e¤ort level, it is interesting to look at its
ingredients, that is individual e¤ort decisions of the contestants. This
allows us to understand deeper mechanisms that govern behavior of the
players under di¤erent policy options, and lead to changes in the total
equilibrium e¤ort level. Therefore, in Appendix we provide complemen-
tary results on the individual e¤ort levels of the contestants.
Case 1
Our analysis in this section we start with the case, in which contestant
1 is the leader. Lets consider rst the e¤ort levels of this contestant.
Proposition 7 In a sequential-move game in which the stronger con-
testant is the leader, if  < 4 ( > 4) the equilibrium e¤ort level of the
leader is lower (higher) under the a¢ rmative action policy than under
the equal treatment policy option, and if  = 4 his equilibrium e¤ort
levels are the same. This can be summarized as
e1 (ET ) T e1 (AA) , if  S 4, respectively.
Proof. Setting i = 1, j = 2 and using corresponding values of policy
weights Pi and marginal cost parameter i (i 2 N) in eq. (13) and (14),
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we obtain that 
e1 (ET ) =

4
V; if < 2,
e1 (ET ) =
1

V; if  2,
and
e1 (AA) =
1
4
V .
To prove the proposition we need to show that for  < 2 the inequality

4
V >
1
4
V , (24)
and for   2 the inequality
1

V T 1
4
V , (25)
if  < 4,  = 4 and  > 4, respectively, are satised.
Consider rst the case of  < 2, given by the inequality (24). Within
the domain of V > 0 and  > 0, this inequality reduces to
 > 1,
which is satised in our model by assumption. It follows, that the in-
equality (24) is always true for  2 (1; 2).
In the second case, if   2, within the domain of V > 0 and  > 0,
the inequality given in (25) reduces to
 S 4,
which is exactly the conditions on  in our claim.
It follows from Proposition 7 that in a sequential-move game in which
the stronger player is the leader, the implementation of the a¢ rmative
action policy option may have detrimental e¤ect on the leaders equi-
librium e¤ort level, as compared to the level under the equal treatment
policy option. In particular if the leader and his opponent are rather
homogenous in terms of their marginal cost of e¤ort, then the imple-
mentation of the a¢ rmative action policy option leads in equilibrium to
the drop in the leaders e¤ort level. The opposite happens if the players
are very heterogenous - in such case his equilibrium e¤ort level increases.
Lets concentrate now on equilibrium e¤ort levels of contestant 2 
the follower.
Proposition 8 In a sequential-move game in which the stronger con-
testant is the leader,
32
(i) in equilibrium under a¢ rmative action policy the follower is always
active, that is, exerts e¤ort at a positive level; and
(ii) his equilibrium e¤ort level is always higher under the a¢ rmative
action policy than under the equal treatment policy option, that is
e2 (ET ) < e

2 (AA) .
Proof. Setting i = 1, j = 2 and using corresponding values of policy
weights Pi and marginal cost parameter i (i 2 N) in eq. (13) and (14),
we obtain that 
e2 (ET ) =
2 
4
V; if < 2,
e2 (ET ) = 0; if  2,
and
e2 (AA) =
1
4
V . (26)
The proof of the part (i) of the proposition is trivial. Given that by
assumption V > 0 and  > 0, the equilibrium e¤ort level of the follower
under a¢ rmative action policy in (26) is always positive, which proves
the claim.
To prove the part (ii) of the proposition we need to show that for
 < 2 the inequality
2  
4
V <
1
4
V; (27)
and for   2 the inequality
0 <
1
4
V; (28)
are satised.
Consider rst the case of  < 2, given by the inequality (27). Using
some algebra, within the domain of V > 0 and  > 0, this inequality
reduces to
(   1)2 > 0,
which is true for all  6= 1. In our model this is always satised, given
that by assumption  > 1. It follows, that the inequality (27) is always
true for  2 (1; 2).
Consider now the inequality (28), for   2. Given that by assump-
tion V > 0 and  > 0, this inequality is always satised. It follows, that
the inequality (28) is always true for   2.
It follows from Proposition 8 that in a sequential-move game in which
the stronger player is the leader, the implementation of the a¢ rmative
action policy option always leads to increasing of the equilibrium e¤ort
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level of the follower, as compared to the level under the equal treatment
policy option. Moreover, under the a¢ rmative action policy option the
follower is always active, that is exerts e¤ort at a positive level.
Case 2
Now, we study the case in which contestant 1 is the follower. Lets
consider rst the e¤ort levels of this contestant.
Proposition 9 In a sequential-move game in which the stronger con-
testant is the follower,
(i) in equilibrium under both policy options the follower is always ac-
tive, that is, exerts e¤ort at a positive level; and
(ii) his equilibrium e¤ort level is always higher under the a¢ rmative
action policy than under the equal treatment policy option, that is
e1 (ET ) < e

1 (AA) .
Proof. Setting i = 2, j = 1 and using corresponding values of policy
weights Pi and marginal cost parameter i (i 2 N) in eq. (13) and (14),
we obtain that 
e1 (ET ) =
2 1
42
V;
e1 (AA) =
1
4
V:
(29)
The proof of the part (i) of the proposition is trivial. Given that by
assumption V > 0 and  > 1, the equilibrium e¤ort levels of the follower
under both policy options in (29) are always positive, which proves the
claim.
To prove the part (ii) of the proposition we need to show that for all
 > 1, the inequality
2   1
42
V <
1
4
V (30)
is satised.
Using some algebra, within the domain of V > 0 and  > 0, the
inequality in (30) reduces to
(   1)2 > 0,
which is true for all  6= 1. In our model this is always satised, given
that by assumption  > 1. Hence, the inequality (30) is always true for
 > 1.
It follows from Proposition 9 that in a sequential-move game in which
the weaker player is the leader, the implementation of the a¢ rmative
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action policy option has always positive e¤ect on the equilibrium e¤ort
level of the follower of the stronger player, as compared to the level
under the equal treatment policy option.
Lets concentrate now on e¤ort levels of contestant 2, who is now the
leader.
Proposition 10 In a sequential-move game in which the stronger con-
testant is the follower, the equilibrium e¤ort level of the leader is always
higher under the a¢ rmative action policy than under the equal treatment
policy option, that is
e2 (ET ) < e

2 (AA) .
Proof. Setting i = 1, j = 2 and using corresponding values of policy
weights Pi and marginal cost parameter i (i 2 N) in eq. (13) and (14),
we obtain that (
e2 (ET ) =
1
42
V;
e2 (AA) =
1
4
V:
To prove the proposition we need to show that in our model, that is
for all  > 1, the inequality
1
42
V <
1
4
V , (31)
is satised.
Using some algebra, within the domain of V > 0 and  > 0, the
inequality (31) reduces to
 > 1,
which is satised in our model by assumption. It follows, that the in-
equality (31) is always true for  > 1.
The conclusion that ows from Proposition 10 is similar to one from
Proposition 9: in a sequential-move game in which the weaker player is
the leader, the implementation of the a¢ rmative action policy option,
as compared to the level under the equal treatment policy option, has
positive e¤ect on the equilibrium e¤ort level in this case on the e¤ort
level of the leader.
Case 1 vs Case 2
Our objective in this section is to compare Case 1 and Case 2 in terms of
individual e¤ort levels that they generate. Additionally, to highlight re-
lations between sequential-move and simultaneous-move games, we con-
sider also in our analysis Case 3, in which contestants make their e¤ort
level decisions simultaneously.
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We begin our analysis by looking at equilibrium e¤ort levels of con-
testants under the equal treatment policy option. Lets consider rst
e¤ort levels of contestant 1.
Proposition 11 Under equal treatment policy, the stronger contestant,
in equilibrium exerts e¤ort at the highest level in the case in which he is
the leader (Case 1) and at the lowest level when he is the follower (Case
2), in a sequential-move game. The level of his equilibrium e¤ort when
the contestants move simultaneously (Case 3) is (strictly) in-between
those produced by Case 1 and 2. It may be summarized as16
e1;2(ET ) < e

1;3(ET ) < e

1;1(ET )
Proof. According to Table 1, under equal treatment policy, the level of
the equilibrium e¤ort for contestant 1 in each Case is
e1;1=
 
4
V; if < 2,
1

V; if  2,
e1;2=
2   1
42
V;
e1;3=

( + 1)2
V:
To prove the proposition we need to show that for  > 1 the inequality
2   1
42
V <

( + 1)2
V , (32)
and for  < 2 the inequality

( + 1)2
V <

4
V; (33)
and for   2 the inequality

( + 1)2
V <
1

V (34)
are satised.
Consider rst the inequality (32). Within the domain of V > 0 and
 > 0, this inequality reduces to
 +
1
2

(   1)2 > 0,
16Recall that ei;k(P ) denotes an equilibrium e¤ort level of a contestant i in Case
k given a policy option P .
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which is satised within the domain of  > 0 for all  6= 1. In our
model this is always true, given that by assumption  > 1. Hence, the
inequality (32) is always satised for  > 1.
Consider now the inequality (33), for  < 2. Within the domain of
V > 0 and  > 0, this inequality reduces to
( + 3) (   1) > 0,
which is satised within the domain of  > 0 for all  > 1. It follows,
that the inequality (33) is always true for  2 (1; 2).
Finally consider the inequality (34), for   2. Within the domain
of V > 0 and  > 0, this inequality reduces to
1 > 0,
which is always true. It follows, that the inequality (34) is always satis-
ed for   2.
Proposition 11 states that under equal treatment policy the stronger
player exerts e¤ort at the highest level when he is the leader, and at the
lowest level when he is the follower in a sequential-move game. His e¤ort
level in a simultaneous-move game is in between the previous sequential-
move game e¤ort levels. It follows that there exist a rst-mover advan-
tage for the stronger player as the leader he exerts e¤ort at the highest
level, higher than when he is the follower or when he moves simultane-
ously with his opponent.
Lets focus now on e¤ort levels of contestant 2, still for the equal
treatment policy option.
Proposition 12 Under equal treatment policy, the weaker contestant,
(i) in equilibrium exerts e¤ort at the highest level in the case in which
the contestants move simultaneously (Case 3), that is
e2;1(ET ); e

2;2(ET )
	
< e2;3(ET );
and
(ii) in a sequential-move case, if  S 1+
p
5
2
, then in equilibrium he
exerts e¤ort at a higher (equal, lower, respectively) level when he
is the follower (Case 1) than when he is the leader (Case 2). It
may be summarized as
e2;1(ET ) T e2;2(ET ); if  S
1 +
p
5
2
:
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Proof. According to Table 1, under equal treatment policy, the level of
the equilibrium e¤ort for contestant 2 in each Case is
e2;1=

2 
4
V; if < 2,
0; if  2,
e2;2=
1
42
V;
e2;3=
1
( + 1)2
V:
To prove the part (i) of the proposition we need to show that for  < 2
the inequality
2  
4
V <
1
( + 1)2
V , (35)
and for   2 the inequality
0 <
1
( + 1)2
V , (36)
and for  > 1 the inequality
1
42
V <
1
( + 1)2
V; (37)
are satised.
Consider rst the inequality (35), for  < 2. Within the domain of
V > 0 and  > 0, this inequality reduces to
( + 2) (   1)2 > 0,
which is satised within the domain of  > 0 for all  6= 1. In our
model this is always true, given that by assumption  > 1. Hence, the
inequality (35) is always satised for  2 (1; 2).
Consider now the inequality (36), for   2. Given that by assump-
tion V > 0 and  > 0, this inequality is always satised. It follows, that
the inequality (36) is always true for   2.
Finally consider the inequality (37). Within the domain of V > 0
and  > 0, this inequality reduces to
 +
1
3

(   1) > 0;
which is satised within the domain of  > 0 for all  > 1. In our
model this is always true, given that by assumption  > 1. Hence, the
inequality (37) is always satised in our model.
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To prove the part (ii) of the proposition we need to show that for
 < 2
2  
4
V T 1
42
V; (38)
if  < 1+
p
5
2
,  = 1+
p
5
2
and  > 1+
p
5
2
, respectively; and that for   2
0 <
1
42
V . (39)
Consider rst the inequality (38), for  < 2. Within the domain of
V > 0 and  > 0, this inequality reduces to
(   1)
 
   1 
p
5
2
! 
   1 +
p
5
2
!
T 0,
whose LHS within the domain of  > 0 is positive for all  2

1; 1+
p
5
2

,
equal to zero for  = 1 [  = 1+
p
5
2
and negative for all  2 (0; 1)[
1+
p
5
2
;1

. As in our model by assumption  > 1, and now  < 2,
this result implies that the LHS of the inequality (38) is higher than the
RHS for all  2

1; 1+
p
5
2

, equal to for  = 1+
p
5
2
, and lower for all  2
1+
p
5
2
; 2

, which is exactly our claim.
Consider now the inequality (39), for   2. Given that by assump-
tion V > 0 and  > 0, this inequality is always satised. It follows, that
the inequality (39) is always true for   2.
It follows from Proposition 12, that under equal treatment policy the
weaker player exerts e¤ort at the highest level when a simultaneous-move
game is played. However, for a sequential-move game the ranking of his
e¤ort levels depends on his marginal cost parameter . If the players
are rather homogenous in terms of their marginal cost of e¤ort, then
the weaker player exerts e¤ort at higher level as the follower than as the
leader. The opposite happens when the players are very heterogenous 
in that case the weaker player exerts e¤ort at higher level as the leader
than as the follower.
Using our results we may compare equilibrium e¤ort levels gener-
ated under the two policy options and in di¤erent Cases. However,
before proceeding we need to state a supplementary result, related to
the simultaneous-move case (Case 3).
Lemma 3 In a simultaneous-move contest game (Case 3), both con-
testants exert e¤ort at a higher level under the a¢ rmative action policy
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option than under the equal treatment policy option. This result can be
summarized as
ei;3(ET ) < e

i;3(AA) for i 2 N;
Proof. See Franke (2007).
Lemma 3 means that in a simultaneous-move contest game (Case 3),
the equilibrium e¤ort levels of contestants are always higher under the
a¢ rmative action policy option than under the equal treatment policy
option.
Now, using Propositions 4, 7, 9, 11 and Lemma 3 we may now rank all
equilibrium e¤ort levels exerted by the stronger contestant contestant
1.
Conclusion 3 The equilibrium e¤ort level of the stronger contestant
satises the following relations:
e1;2(ET ) < e

1;3(ET ) <

e1;1(ET ); e

1;1 3(AA)
	
and
e1;1 (ET ) T e1;1 3 (AA) , if  S 4, respectively.
Similarly, using Propositions 4, 8, 10, 12 and Lemma 3 we can rank
all equilibrium e¤ort levels exerted by the weaker contestant contestant
2.
Conclusion 4 The equilibrium e¤ort level of the weaker contestant sat-
ises the following relations:
e2;1(ET ); e

2;2(ET )
	
< e2;3(ET ) < e

2;1 3(AA)
and
e2;1(ET ) T e2;2(ET ); if  S
1 +
p
5
2
; respectively:
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